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Abstract. In this work, we mainly study the mechanism of learning the ste-
ganographic algorithm as well as combining the learning process with adversarial 
learning to learn a good steganographic algorithm. To handle the problem of em-
bedding secret messages into the specific medium, we design a novel adversarial 
modules to learn the steganographic algorithm, and simultaneously train three 
modules called generator, discriminator and steganalyzer. Different from existing 
methods, the three modules are formalized as a game to communicate with each 
other. In the game, the generator and discriminator attempt to communicate with 
each other using secret messages hidden in an image. While the steganalyzer at-
tempts to analyze whether there is a transmission of confidential information. We 
show that through unsupervised adversarial training, the adversarial model can 
produce robust steganographic solutions, which act like an encryption. Further-
more, we propose to utilize supervised adversarial training method to train a ro-
bust steganalyzer, which is utilized to discriminate whether an image contains 
secret information. Numerous experiments are conducted on publicly available 
dataset to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
Keywords: Steganography, Steganalysis, Adversarial learning. 
1 Introduction 
Steganography aims to conceal a payload into a cover object without affecting the 
sharpness of the cover object. The image steganography is the art and science of con-
cealing covert information within images, and is usually achieved by modifying image 
elements, such as pixels or DCT coefficients. Steganographic algorithms are designed 
to hide the secret information within a cover message such that the cover message ap-
pears unaltered to an external adversary. On the other side, steganalysis aims to reveal 
the presence of secret information by detecting the abnormal artefacts left by data em-
bedding and recover the secret information of the carrier object. For a long period of 
time, many researchers have been involved in developing new steganographic systems. 
Meanwhile, the development of steganalytic tools are also started growing. We have 
found that the relationship between these two aspects is similar with adversarial learn-
ing, so we leverage the ideas from adversarial learning to optimize them simultane-
ously. 
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Adversarial learning is based on the game theory, and is combined with unsupervised 
way to jointly train the model. In our previous work [19], we proposed a novel strategy 
of secure steganograpy based on generative adversarial networks to generate suitable 
and secure covers for steganography, in which the decoding process was not consid-
ered. In this paper, we not only encode the secret messages into the images, but also 
decode it utilizing the network. Then, we utilize the  steganalysis network to detect the 
presence of hidden messages. Through unsupervised training, the generator plays the 
role of a sender, which is utilized to generate steganographic images as real as possible. 
As the discriminator plays the role of a receiver, it not only differentiates real images 
and generated images, but also extracts the secret messages. And the steganalysis net-
work, as a listener of the whole process, incorporates supervised learning with adver-
sarial training to compete against state-of-the-art steganalysis methods. 
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions: 
(1) We incorporate the generative adversarial network into steganography, which 
proves to be a good way of encryption. 
(2) We integrate the unsupervised learning method and supervised learning method 
to train the generator and steganalyzer respectively, and receive robust steganographic 
techniques in unsupervised manner. 
(3) We also utilize the discriminative network to extract the secret information. Ex-
periments are conducted on widely used datasets, to demonstrate the advantages of the 
proposed method. 
    The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related 
work of steganography, adversarial networks. In Section 3, we elaborate the proposed 
method. In Section 4, experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the proposed method. In Section 5, we draw conclusions. 
2 Related work 
2.1 Steganography 
The image-based steganography algorithm can be split into two categories. The one is 
based on the spatial domain, the other is based on the DCT domain. In our work, we 
mainly focus on the spatial domain steganography. The state-of-the-art steganographic 
schemes concentrate on embedding secret information within a medium while mini-
mizing the perturbations within that medium. On the contrary, steganalysis is to figure 
out whether there is secret information or not in the medium. 
Least Significant Bit (LSB) [12] is one of the most popular embedding methods in 
spatial domain steganography. If LSB is adopted as the steganography method, the sta-
tistical features of the image are destroyed. And it is easy to detect by the steganalyzer. 
For convenience and simple implementation, the LSB algorithm hides the secret to the 
least significant bits in the given image’s channel of each pixel. Mostly, the modifica-
tion of the LSB algorithm is called ±1-embedding. It randomly adds or subtracts 1 from 
the channel pixel, so the last bits would match the ones needed. 
Besides the LSB algorithm, some sophisticated steganographic schemes choose to 
use a distortion function which is used for selecting the embedding localization of the 
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image. This type of steganography is called the content-adaptive steganography. The 
minimization of the distortion function between the cover image 𝐶  and the ste-
ganographic image 𝑆 is usually required. These algorithms are the most popular and the 
most secure image steganography in spatial domain, such as HUGO (Highly Undetect-
able steGO) [4], WOW (Wavelet Obtained Weights) [2], S-UNIWARD (spatial uni-
versal wavelet relative distortion) [3], etc.   
 𝑑(𝐶, 𝑆) = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝑆) ∗ |𝐶 − 𝑆| (1) 
where 𝑓(𝐶, 𝑆)  is the cost of modifying a pixel, which is variable in different ste-
ganographic algorithms. 
HUGO is a steganographic scheme that defines a distortion function domain by as-
signing costs to pixels based on the effect of embedding some information within a 
pixel. It uses a weighted norm function to represent the feature space. WOW is another 
content-adaptive steganographic method that embeds information into a cover image 
according to textural complexity of regions. It is shown in WOW that the more complex 
the image region is, the more pixel values will be modified in this region. S-UNIWARD 
introduces a universal distortion function that is independent of the embedded domain. 
Despite the diverse implementation details, the ultimate goals are identical, i.e. they are 
all devoted to minimize this distortion function, to embed the information into the noise 
area or complex texture, and to avoid the smooth image coverage area. 
2.2 Adversarial Learning 
In recent years, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been successfully ap-
plied to image generation tasks. The method that generative adversarial networks gen-
erate images can be classified in two categories in general. The first is mainly exploring 
image synthesis tasks in an unconditioned manner that generates synthetic images with-
out any supervised learning schemes. Goodfellow et al. [7] propose a theoretical frame-
work of GANs and utilize GANs to generate images without any supervised infor-
mation. However, the early GANs has somewhat noisy and blurry results and some-
times the gradient will be vanished when training the networks. Later, Radford et al. 
[15] propose a deep convolutional generative adversarial networks (DCGANs) for un-
supervised representation. To solve the situation of gradient vanishing, WGAN [14] is 
proposed using the Wasserstein distance instead of the Jensen-Shannon divergence, to 
make the data set distribution compared with the learning distribution from G.  
Another direction of image synthesis with GANs is to synthesize images by condi-
tioning on supervised information, such as text or class labels. The Conditional GAN 
[16] is one of the works that develop a conditional version of GANs by additionally 
feeding class labels into both generator and discriminator of GANs. Info-GAN [17] 
introduces a new concept, which divides the input noise z into two parts, one is the 
continuous noise signal that cannot be explained, and the other is called C. Where C 
represents a potential attribute that can be interpreted as a facial expression, such as the 
color of eyes, whether with glasses or not, etc. in the facial tasks. Recently, Reed et al. 
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[18] utilize GANs for image synthesis using given text descriptions, enabling transla-
tion from character level to pixel level.  
Adversarial learning has been applied to steganographic and cryptographic prob-
lems. In Abadi’s [1] work, they integrate two neural networks to adversarial game to 
encrypt a secret message. In which game the discriminator can be deceived. In this 
paper, we are devoted to training a model that can learn a steganographic technique by 
itself making full use of the discriminator and recovering the secret message synchro-
nously. 
3 Adversarial Steganography 
This section mainly discusses our proposed adversarial steganographic scheme. In sec-
tion 3.1, we elaborate the network architecture of our model. Then, we formulate the 
problem of steganography and steganalysis to point out the foundation of the proposed 
steganographic scheme. 
3.1 Network Architecture 
Our model consists of three components. The generator is used to generate ste-
ganographic images. Besides discriminating between real images and generated im-
ages, the discriminator is utilized to extract the secret messages. And the steganalyzer 
is utilized to distinguish covers from steganographic images. 
Generator. The generator receives the cover images and secret messages. Before 
learning the distribution of the images, the secret messages are first embedded into the 
cover image. The generated steganographic images are then put into the generator. As 
shown in Fig.1, we use a fully connected layer, which can cover anywhere of the image 
not merely a fixed region. Then four fractionally-strided convolution layers, and finally 
a Hyperbolic tangent function layer. The architecture is as shown in Fig. 1.
 
Fig. 1. The architecture of the generator 
Discriminator. The discriminator is mainly responsible for extracting the secret 
messages. Besides, it can also help to optimize the visual quality of the generated im-
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ages. We use four convolutional layers, and a fully connected layer. In detail, we addi-
tionally add a decoding function at the end of the network to extract the secret messages. 
The decoding function is acted as an interface between the steganographic images and 
the secret messages. It analyzes the modification of pixels in images, and recovers the 
message. The architecture is as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. The architecture of the discriminator 
Steganalyzer. The steganalyzer’s inputs are both covers and steganographic im-
ages. The steganalyzer’s architecture is similar to the discriminator, as is illustrated in 
Fig. 3. With distinct, we first use a predefined high-pass filter to make a filtering oper-
ation, which is mainly for steganalysis. And then we use four convolutional layers. 
Finally, we use a classification layer, which includes several fully connected layers. 
 
Fig. 3. The architecture of the steganalyzer 
3.2 Optimization Objective 
Our training scheme includes three parties: generator, discriminator and steganalyzer. 
In this game, the generator conveys a secret medium to the discriminator, which the 
steganalyzer attempts to eavesdrop the conveying process and find out whether there 
are some special information containing in the process. Generally speaking, the gener-
ator generates a steganographic image within the cover image embedded with a secret 
message. Then generator passes it to the next network which we call discriminator, 
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concentrating on decoding and recovering the message. When an image is input to the 
steganalyzer, a confidence probability will be output by steganalyzer on how much 
likely the image is hidden with a secret message.  
     For the whole process of information conveying is transparent to the discriminator, 
so the decoding can be easily achieved. In the game of the three parties, the generator 
is trained to learn to produce a steganographic image such that the discriminator can 
decode and recover the secret message, and such that the steganalyzer can output a 
better probability whether it is a cover or a steganographic image. 
 
Fig. 4. The whole architecture of the training game. 𝑀 and 𝑀′ represents the secret message and 
extracted message from the steganographic image respectively, 𝐶 represents the cover image, 
and 𝑆𝐶 represents the steganographic image. 𝑝 is the probability of classifying the co-
vers and steganographic images. 𝑝′ is the probability of classifying the real images and 
generated images. 
The whole architecture can be depicted in Fig. 4, the generator receives a cover 
image, 𝐶, and a secret message, 𝑀. Combined with the above two inputs, it outputs a 
steganographic image, 𝑆/ , which is simultaneously given to the discriminator and ste-
ganalyzer. Once receiving the steganographic image, the discriminator decodes it and 
attempts to recover the message. For the game is under generative adversarial networks, 
the discriminator can also improve the visual quality of the generated images. In addi-
tion to the steganographic images, the cover images are also input into the steganalyzer, 
whose output is a probability to classify the steganographic images and covers. 
We let 𝜔1 , 𝜔2 , 𝜔3  denote the parameters of generator, discriminator and ste-
ganalyzer respectively. We utilize 𝐺(𝜔1,𝑀, 𝐶) represents generator’s output given an 
image 𝐶  and secret message 𝑀 , 𝐷(𝜔2, 𝑆/)  for discriminator’s output on ste-
ganographic images 𝑆/ , and 𝑆(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/) for steganalyzer’s output on covers and ste-
ganographic images. Then we use 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3 represent the loss of three networks re-
spectively. And we can calculate as follows: 𝐷(𝜔2, 𝑆/) = 𝐷(𝜔2, 𝐺(𝜔1,𝑀, 𝐶))                                 (2) 𝑆(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/) = 𝑆(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝐺(𝜔1,𝑀, 𝐶))                              (3) 
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where the 𝐷(𝜔2, 𝑆/) is output of the discriminator, 𝑆(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/) is the output of the 
steganalyzer. 
For the generator’s loss, we correspond it with the other two networks. And we add 
constraints to normalize the loss. 𝐿1(𝜔1,𝑀, 𝐶) = 𝜆1 ∙ 𝑑(𝐶, 𝑆/) + 𝜆2 ∙ 𝐿2(𝜔2, 𝑆/) + 𝜆3 ∙ 𝐿3(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/)    (4) 
where 𝑑(𝐶, 𝑆/) is the Euclidean distance between the covers and the steganographic 
images. And 𝜆1,	𝜆2, 𝜆3 are the calculation loss weights of the generator, discriminator 
and steganalyzer respectively. These variables are varying from [0,1]. 
Also, we set discriminator’s loss to be the norm form. Here, we use the ℓ@ norm. 𝐿2(𝜔1, 𝜔2,𝑀, 𝐶) = A|𝑀,𝐷(𝜔2, 𝑆/)|A@ = ||𝑀,𝐷(𝜔2, 𝐺(𝜔1,𝑀, 𝐶))||@ = ||𝑀,𝑀′||@(5) 
where the form ||𝑀,𝑀′||@ is the distance between 𝑀 and 𝑀′. 
And we set steganalyzer’s loss to be binary cross-entropy of logistic regression. 𝐿3(𝜔1, 𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/) = − BC ∑ 𝑦 ln 𝑆(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/) + (1 − 𝑦) ln(1 − 𝑆(𝜔3, 𝐶, 𝑆/))H     (6) 
where 𝑦 = 1 if 𝑥 = 𝐶, which means classifying the images as covers, 𝑦 = 0 if 𝑥 = 𝑆/ , 
which means the steganographic images are identified. 
We apply adversarial learning techniques to discriminative tasks to learn the ste-
ganographic algorithm. Under unsupervised adversarial training, the model can pro-
duce steganographic techniques, which act like an encryption. 
4 Experiments 
Experiments are conducted on two image datasets: celebrity faces in the wild (CelebA) 
[8] consisting of 202,599 images and BossBase, which is a dataset of 10000 grayscale 
images of various scenes. Our datasets are formed of 64 × 64 pixel images. For the 
choice of 𝑀, we concatenate a random paragraph message to generalize our model to 
random message, with each sample of each dataset. And we consider different kinds of 
embedding rates, which vary from 0.1bpp (bits per pixel) to 0.4bpp. Generally, most 
steganographic algorithms can successfully hide secret message approximately at 
0.4bpp. All experiments were performed in TensorFlow [9], on a workstation with a 
Titan X GPU. 
4.1 CelebA dataset 
CelebA dataset contains 202,599 images of celebrity faces from 10,177 unique identi-
ties. We train the model using RMSProp optimization algorithm with the learning rate 
of 2 × 10LM. At each batch we train either the generator, discriminator, or steganalyzer 
alternatively.  
From the results, we can see that there is no noticeable image quality decrease be-
tween 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp. As is shown in Fig. 5. And we also calculate the PSNR (Peak 
Signal to Noise Ratio) to evaluate the steganographic effect. As is shown in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 5. The above are the covers and steganographic images of CelebA dataset. (a) represents the 
covers, (b) represents the steganographic images with the embedding rates of 0.1bpp, (c) repre-
sents the steganographic images with the embedding rates of 0.4bpp.  
 
Fig. 6. (a) represents the contrast of PSNR of embedding rates at 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp. (b) repre-
sents the contrast of successful decoding rates between 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp. The blue bar repre-
sents the results at 0.1bpp, while the yellow bar represents the results at 0.4bpp. 
From the charts, we can see that the discriminator can hardly decode the secret mes-
sages in the first few rounds of training. For the visual quality of the generated images 
is low and the discriminator is randomly guessing the message essentially. After 800 
training steps, the discriminator can decode the message correctly with an average suc-
cess of 90% at 0.4bpp. After 1,000 training steps, the discriminator approaches to con-
vergence gradually and decodes the message with success rate above 95%. We can also 
conclude that the discriminator performs better under embedding rate at 0.4bpp than 
0.1bpp when decoding the messages. 
4.2 BossBase dataset 
In addition to the experiments on the CelebA dataset, we also trained our model on the 
BossBase dataset, which is a standard steganography dataset. For the images from this 
dataset do not come from a single distribution, so the dataset can perform worse than 
the experiments on the CelebA dataset. 
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Fig. 7. The above are the covers and steganographic images of BossBase dataset. (a) represents 
the covers, (b) represents the steganographic images with the embedding rates of 0.1bpp, (c) 
represents the steganographic images with the embedding rates of 0.4bpp.  
 
Fig. 8. (a) represents the contrast of PSNR of embedding rates at 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp. (b) repre-
sents the contrast of successful decoding rates between 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp. The blue bar repre-
sents the results at 0.1bpp, while the yellow bar represents the results at 0.4bpp. 
It is shown in Fig. 8 that the contrast of PSNR and successful decoding rates at 
0.1bpp and 0.4bpp. While the decoding rates suffers slightly from the image quality, 
the discriminator is still able to learn to decode the message successfully. This also 
implies the effectiveness of the generator, which is able to learn a good steganographic 
algorithm. 
We can conclude from the two groups of experiments that for the datasets with dis-
tinct distribution, different embedding rates can influence the similarity between the 
original images and the embedded images. 
4.3 Comparison with the state-of-the-arts 
We train in such a way that the steganalyzer can detect the covers and steganographic 
images with low rates. Thus, on the basis of this experiment, we additionally conduct 
another experiment compared with the state-of-the-art steganographic algorithms. 
Which also shows competitive results.  
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For both datasets, we compare our scheme against steganographic algorithms HUGO 
and S-UNIWARD. As is shown in Table 1, our steganalyzer performs competitively. 
By training steganalyzer in a supervised fashion, the experiments show that it has the 
capacity to become a strong steganalyzer, competing against established techniques like 
GNCNN, and so is a good choice for the steganalyzer. Furthermore, for both the CelebA 
and BossBase datasets, we use 10,000 samples and split them in half, creating a training 
set and a test set. And we then trained the generator on the training set. Following this, 
we then created an additional 5,000 steganographic images utilizing each steganogra-
phy algorithm. Thus, we can make the cover set and steganographic images set consist 
of 5,000 images respectively. 
Table 1. Accuracy of distinguishing between cover and steganographic images for the GNCNN 
and Steganalyzer at an embedding rate of 0.4bpp. 
 CelebA BossBase 
Steganographic 
Algorithm 
Steganalyzer Steganalyzer 
 GNCNN Steganalyzer GNCNN Steganalyzer 
HUGO 0.93 0.91 0.72 0.68 
S-UNIWARD 0.91 0.89 0.75 0.71 
Generator 0.94 0.92 0.83 0.82 
 
As demonstrated in the experiments, the steganalyzer performs competitively against 
the GNCNN [10], and the generator also performs well against other steganographic 
techniques. The experimental data shows that on the one hand, the generated images 
are good at visual quality. On the other hand, the generated images are harder to detect, 
which shows the security of the generated images as covers. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, an adversarial steganography architecture with generative adversarial net-
works is proposed. On the basis of generative adversarial networks, we leverage the 
adversarial structure to form an effective steganographic method. Encouraging results 
are received from experiments conducted on the widely used datasets in comparison 
with several state-of-the-art methods. It is also worth to study the adoption of the ad-
versarial steganography architecture in adaptive steganographic algorithm. Further-
more, it is interesting to resort the networks to a game-theoretic formulation when we 
characterize the interplay between the steganographer and the steganalyst. 
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